Grenada and Mission Command Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words

Grenada and Mission Command - Essay Example As a function of this breakdown, the US Atlantic Command was forced to keep a close hold of the operation; so much so that it did not successfully transmit needed information to the US Readiness Command. This led to many command elements being unaware of the initial planning stages; thereby leading the entire operation to the point of leaving out key elements of command from the planning process. Quite obviously, such an oversight led to many problematic issues during the logistical execution of the operation itself. US Second Fleet: This command unit was given overall control of the operation. Under the leadership of Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, the US Second Fleet formed Joint Task Force 120 with overall responsibility of the Operation Urgent Fury. The Second Fleet had a clear understanding of the intent and objectives of the orders of the Atlantic Fleet passed on from President Regan. However, here as well there was a breach in the building of cohesive teams. This lack of cohe sion naturally deterred a building of mutual trust when the recommendation of Admiral Metcalf II to have army Major General Norman Schwarzkopf be put in charge of the overall ground operations instead of Major General Edward Trobaugh was quashed due to its clear abrogation and deviation from the chain of command. While Admiral Metcalf III knew that most of the operation would be ground based, more suited under command of an army command unit, this was unfortunately never considered openly in the planning stage. Regardless of such an oversight and/or prejudice, the Second Fleet was still up to the task and was able to establish proper command and communication channels to the units under its command. XVIII Airborne Corps: Under the leadership of Lieutenant General Jack Mackmull, this command unit was in charge of the majority of logistics and sustainment of the operations in Grenada. Although this command unit had an important role, it was overlooked by the main planners during the p lanning phase. Near the beginning of operations, the Atlantic Command requested that the XVIII Airborne Corps’ subordinate 82nd Airborne Division be placed in combat readiness without being given a clear or otherwise full idea of what the situation entailed. It was also found that the XVIII Airborne Corps was excluded by the Atlantic Command from the planning phase; additionally compounding the initial problem of logistics and sustainment of participating ground forces. Among the participating command unit